In cricket, the right to make an important decision (bat …rst or …eld …rst) is assigned via a coin toss. These "randomised trials" allow us to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences, and the e¤ects of these choices upon game outcomes. Random assignment allows us to consistently aggregate across matches, ensuring that our tests have power. We …nd signi…cant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat …rst. Choices are often poorly made and reduce the probability of the team winning, a surprising …nding given the intense competition and learning opportunities.
While the assumption of rational behaviour underlies most economic theory, this is being questioned by the recent rise of behavioural economics. Since Kahneman and Tversky's pioneering work, many experiments demonstrate that subjects have a variety of biases when they deal with uncertainty. Experimental subjects also do not perform well when playing simple games -O'Neill's (1987) experiments on games with a unique completely mixed equilibrium are a case in point. The interpretation of these results is however debatable. Subjects in experiments are placed in an unfamiliar and somewhat arti…cial situation, and usually have insu¢ cient opportunities to learn how to choose optimally. Their incentives to do so may also be limited.
Professional sports provide several instances of alternative real life experiments, which are not subject to some of these criticisms. Professional players spend their prime years learning how to play optimally, and are repeatedly involved in familiar situations. They also have high-powered incentives. The rules of the game are clear cut, as in experiments, even though they have not been designed with academic economists in mind. An emerging literature has exploited this data source. Walker and Wooders (2001) study the serve behaviour of professional tennis players, and …nd that behaviour corresponds closely to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the associated game. Similar support for the mixed equilibrium is found in the case of penalty kicks in soccer (Chiappori et. al. (2002) and Palacios Huertas (2003)). These results contrast rather sharply with the negative experimental results on games with a unique mixed equilibrium. Given the incentive e¤ects and the opportunities to learn, violations of optimality in professional sports also need to be taken seriously by economists. Thus Romer (2006) uses dynamic programming to analyze strategy in American football, and …nds that decisions are not made optimally. 1 This paper investigates the rationality of strategic decisions in the game of cricket. Cricket is a game played between two teams, one of which must bat …rst, while the other team …elds. The roles of the teams are then reversed. The decision, as to whether a team bats …rst or …elds …rst, is randomly assigned to the captain of one of the two teams, via the toss of a coin. From a decision theoretic point of view, this strategic decision combines several important qualities. First, the batting or …elding is not assigned by the coin toss, but must be chosen by the winner. Second, this choice is recognised by cricket players to be an important decision, since the conditions for batting or …elding can vary over time, with variation in the weather and condition of the natural surface on which the game is played. Choosing correctly is non trivial, since the optimal choice depends upon natural conditions -in the matches we consider, the team winning the toss has chosen to bat on roughly half the occasions. From an economist's standpoint, the right to decide is assigned via a coin toss thereby providing a randomised trial par excellence, and allowing us to test for the rationality of choices. Finally, international cricket is intensely competitive, and decisions made by the captain are the subject of endless discussions in the media, presumably providing incentives for making the right decision.
Our tests of rationality are of two types, internal consistency and external validity. The intuition underlying our empirical test of consistency in decision making is straightforward. We start from the presumption that all the multifarious considerations that in ‡uence the decision, including the nature of the pitch, the strengths of the respective teams and the weather (i.e. the state of the world), are only of relevance through their e¤ect on two probability distributions -the probability distribution over the outcomes of the game when team 1 bats …rst, and the probability distribution over outcomes when team 2 bats …rst. If team 1 wins the toss, it will choose to bat if it prefers the former probability distribution to the latter probability distribution. If this is so and if the interests of the teams are perfectly opposed, this implies that team 2 will prefer the latter probability distribution to the former, and must choose to bat …rst if it wins the toss. 2 Thus at any state of the world, 1 chooses to bat …rst if and only if 2 chooses to bat …rst. Of course in any match, we only observe one of these decisions, since only one of the teams wins the toss. However, since identity of the winner of the toss is a random variable which is independent of the state of the world, this allows us to aggregate across any subset of the set of possible states, to make the following probabilistic statement: the probability that team 1 bats …rst given that it wins the toss must equal the probability that it …elds …rst given that its opponent wins the toss. Thus our test of rationality is a test of the consistency of the decisions made by a team and its opponents. This is akin to tests of revealed preference theory -while revealed preference theory tests the consistency of a single decision maker who is assumed to have stable preferences over time, we test the consistency of decisions of pairs of agents whose interests are perfectly opposed. The assignment of decision rights via a coin toss implies that our tests are valid under aggregation. That is, one can pool a team matches against all its opponents, thereby ensuring considerable power. The reason for this is that in any match, the event that team 1 wins the toss is independent of identity of its opponent. In contrast, the tests of mixed strategy equilibria (e.g. in the case of penalty kicks in soccer, as Chiappori et. al. (2002) observe) are not valid under aggregation -although the probability of scoring is equal for kicks to the right and kicks to the left for any kicker-keeper pair, they are no longer equal when we aggregate across pairs, since the probability of scoring di¤ers across pairs and may be correlated with the equilibrium mixing probability.
Our basic …nding is that the consistency of decisions is violated for an important class of cricket matches -one day internationals which are played in the day-time -since some teams systematically choose di¤erently from their opponents. This rejection is based on a sample of over 1300 matches. We explore di¤erent explanations for this lack of consistency, including asymmetric information, but conclude that the best explanation is in terms of teams overweighting their own strengths (and weaknesses) and underweighting the strengths of their opponents in making decisions.
These randomised trials also allow us to infer the external validity of decisions since we can infer the e¤ects of the choices upon the outcome of the game. Consider a state of the world ! where batting …rst is optimal, and where team 1 garners an advantage (!) > 0 from choosing to bat, where is the di¤erence between win probabilities when team 1 bats …rst and when it …elds …rst. Then at this state of the world, its opponent team 2 has an identical advantage (!) from batting …rst. Thus one has a randomised trial where the winner of the toss is assigned to the treatment group and its "twin", the team losing the toss, is assigned to the control group. Our substantive …ndings are intriguing since there is strong evidence that teams are making decisions sub-optimally in one day international day matches, since the e¤ect of choosing to bat …rst is estimated to reduce the probability of winning. The results are robust to allowing for asymmetric information, and controls for the relative abilities of di¤erent teams. This raises intriguing questions, since sub-optimal behaviour seems to have persisted over an extremely long period of time, despite the competitiveness of the environment and relative simplicity of the statistical inference problem. We should also mention that for one class of matches -day-night matches (i.e. matches which are partially played at night-time), both consistency and external validity are not rejected -teams have a strong preference for batting …rst in daylight, a strategy that is empirically found to be sound.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out our model of the basic strategic decision, and derives its empirical implications. Section 3 reports the empirical results. Section 4 explores various explanations for anomalous results such as asymmetric information and agency problems. The …nal section concludes.
Modelling decisions
We set out our model of decision making in cricket. First we set out some background information, before proceeding to the implications of rational decision making between a pair of teams. We then show that the results we derive are valid under aggregation.
Background
The focus of this paper is on one day international matches, which are played at the highest level, between representative national teams. A team, consisting of eleven individuals, bats once, during which time its opponent …elds. The batting team's aim is to score runs, and the winner of the game is the team that scores more runs while batting. Batting, and the scoring of runs, is subject to two constraints. First, the batting team has a …xed maximum number of balls (or scoring opportunities), usually 300. Second, in attempting to score runs, a batsman may lose his wicket and no more runs can be scored once ten batsmen lose their wickets. One day matches have essentially only two outcomes, win or loss, making risk preferences irrelevant, and implying an immediate zero sum property on preferences so long as each team prefers to win. This makes one day matches ideal for our analysis. 3 The sequence in which the teams bat is decided via the toss of a coin. The captain of the team that wins the toss has to choose whether to bat …rst or to …eld …rst. This decision is acknowledged to be of strategic importance by cricket players and observers, since the advantage o¤ered to the bowlers of the …elding team varies with the weather, and the condition of the pitch (the natural surface on which play takes place). Unlike baseball, the ball usually strikes the pitch before it reaches the batsman, and may bounce or deviate to di¤erent degrees depending upon the pitch. The ability to exploit the pitch and conditions also depends upon the type of bowler. Fast bowlers bene…t when there is moisture in the pitch, early in the match, since this increases the speed and bounce o¤ the pitch. Fast bowlers also like overcast conditions. On the other hand, bowlers who spin the ball are more e¤ective later in a game, after the pitch has been worn out through play. The pitch may also deteriorate, so that it becomes rather di¢ cult to bat towards the end of a match. Playing conditions are also rather di¤erent between matches which are played entirely in the day (which we call day matches), and matches which are played partially at night (day-night matches). In day-night matches, the team batting second bats at night under ‡oodlights, and may be at a disadvantage. One possible advantage in batting second (i.e. …elding …rst) arises from knowing the exact number of runs you need to make in order to win the game. The team batting …rst seeks to score as many runs as possible subject to two constraints -the number of balls it has available, and the number of wickets. If it attempts to score too quickly, it may lose wickets and be unable to utilise all the balls available. On the other hand, a more cautious strategy may result in a moderate score. Dynamic programming analysis (see Clark (1988) and Preston and Thomas (2000) ), which assumes that a batting team can choose the scoring rate, at the cost of losing wickets stochastically more quickly, suggests that this gives the team batting second a signi…cant advantage.
A no-agreement result
We set out the following simple model of decision making in the game of cricket. Let the two teams be i and j, and let us describe the outcome from the standpoint of team i: We will not make any assumptions of symmetry of ability or strengths across the two teams. Consider the decision of the team, as to whether bat …rst or to …eld …rst. This decision is made by the captain who wins the toss, and many factors will in ‡uence this decision. To model this, let ! denote the state of the world -this includes a complete speci…cation of all the circumstances which a¤ect the outcome of the cricket match, including the quality and type of bowlers in each side, the quality of the batsmen, the weather, the state of the pitch, etc. Let denote the set of all possible states of the world. Thus ! determines a pair ( p(!) , q(!) ); where p(!) denotes the probability that team i wins given that it bats …rst, and q(!) denotes the probability of a win when it …elds …rst. We shall assume symmetric information, i.e. that the state ! is observed by team i and by team j before they make their decision. Let (!) = p(!) q(!): Figure 1 graphs as a function of !; where is depicted as a compact interval, with states arranged in order of decreasing : It is immediate that team i will choose to bat …rst at states ! where (!) > 0. Similarly, team i will choose to …eld …rst if (!) < 0: Finally, we assume that the set of states ! such that (!) = 0 is negligible, i.e. this set has zero prior probability.
Turning to team j; it will choose to bat …rst on winning the toss if its probability of winning is higher than when …elding, i.e. if 1 q(!) > 1 p(!); i.e. if p(!) q(!) = (!) > 0: We deduce that the set of states where i bats …rst is the same as the set of states where j bats …rst, so that the two teams can never agree on who is to bat …rst, a no agreement result. Let B (resp. F )
denote the set of states where batting …rst (resp. …elding …rst) is optimal. At any state, we only observe the decision of one of the two players. However, the right to take this decision is via a coin toss, which is independent of the state of the world. To an outside observer, the probability that team i bats …rst conditional on winning the toss equals the probability that ! 2 B ; Pr( B ):
Similarly, the probability that team j chooses to bat …rst also equals the Pr( B ):
Thus if we consider any two teams, the observed decisions of team i when it wins the toss are realizations of a Bernoulli random variable with success probability Pr( B ): Similarly, under no agreement, the decisions of team j are also realizations of the same Bernoulli random variable. Under the null hypothesis induced by the no agreement result, the proportion of times that i bats …rst on winning the toss is equal to the proportion of times that j bats …rst on winning the toss. The no agreement result relies on the fact that the teams have strictly opposed von-Neumann Morgenstern preferences over the set of outcomes. Such an opposition of preferences is immediate when the game has only two possible outcomes, win and loss, and where each team prefers to win. However, the match can also have "no result"when bad weather drastically curtails play. Since this outcome largely depends upon exogenous factors such as the weather, its probability is unlikely to be a¤ected by who bats …rst, and our analysis can be straightforwardly extended to allow for this. A match can also be tied when the scores of the two teams are exactly equal -this occurs with probability less than 0.01, which suggests that the marginal e¤ect of the batting/…elding choice upon this probability is minuscule. Thus the assumption of zero sum preferences appears to be well founded.
The no-agreement result is straightforward, and follows from the Harsanyi doctrine, that di¤erences in beliefs must re ‡ect di¤erences in information. However, it does not seem straightforward to professional cricketers, who often suggest that a team might choose in line with its strengths. Thus they …nd it entirely reasonable that a team with a strong batting line up could choose to bat …rst, while its opponent with good fast bowlers might choose to …eld …rst. 4 This suggests a natural alternative hypothesis: that teams overweight their own strengths or weaknesses when making a decision, while underweighting the strengths/weaknesses of their opponents. Consider for example a situation where team i has a strong fast bowling attack, while team j does not have such a strong attack of fast bowlers, but has good batsmen. Thus team i may choose to …eld …rst since it feels that its bowlers may be able to exploit the conditions early in the match. On the other hand, team j may prefer to bat …rst, since it has less con…dence in its fast bowlers. If teams did have asymmetric strengths, and if they overweight their own strengths, then the null hypothesis would be systematically violated -in this example, team i would bat …rst less frequently than team j did. 5 Our tests of the no-agreement result can be viewed of tests of the consistency of the decisions made by the captains of the two teams. As such, these tests are similar to tests of single agent decision theory (e.g. tests based on individual consumption data or experiments), the novelty here being that we are able to use the decisions made by di¤erent agents.
Treatment e¤ects: decisions and outcomes
We now turn to the e¤ects of the choices made upon the outcome of the game. What is the advantage conferred by batting …rst, on winning the toss? The decision to bat …rst is clearly endogenous, unlike the winning of the toss. Using the terminology of the literature on treatment e¤ects (e.g. Heckman et. al.
(1999)), let batting …rst be the treatment. Clearly, batting …rst is optimal only for a subset of states, B : Our interest is in the average e¤ ect of the treatment when the treatment is optimal, i.e. E( (!)j B ). This is more interesting than the unconditional expectation of ; or the average treatment e¤ect. A medical analogy may be useful here. Think of two procedures, surgical and non-surgical, which may be chosen by a doctor. One is interested in the e¤ect of surgery upon some outcome when surgery is optimal, not the average e¤ect of surgery, including states where surgery is clearly suboptimal. The di¢ culty in the medical context is that for any patient who is treated, one does not have a corresponding control. However, in the cricket context, whenever B occurs, the team that wins the toss is assigned the treatment (under our assumption of rational decision making), while the team that loses the toss is assigned to the control group. Furthermore, this assignment of teams (to the treatment or control groups) is random and independent of team characteristics, since it is made via the coin toss. Indeed, it is striking that at any state ! 2 B ; the winner of the toss is assigned to the treatment group, and has advantage (!) from this assignment, whereas the loser of the toss who is assigned to the control group has an identical disadvantage from this assignment. Thus the di¤erence in performance between the teams that win the toss and bat …rst and those that lose the toss and …eld …rst, provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment e¤ect when the treatment is optimal. More formally, consider a match between teams i and j. Recall that team i bats …rst on winning the toss if and only if ! 2 B : Thus the probability of the event that team i wins the toss and bats …rst and wins the game is given by
where f (!) is the probability density function of !: Similarly,
So the conditional probability that a team wins, given that it wins the toss and bats …rst, is given by the sum of the above two expressions, divided by the probability of the event B :
= 0:
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (!) > 0 for any ! 2 B :
In other words, if both teams choose optimally, the estimated treatment e¤ect -of batting …rst when batting is optimal -must be greater than 0:5:Similar reasoning establishes that Pr[Winj(win toss and …eld) = 0:
since (!) < 0 for any ! 2 F : Finally, the advantage conferred by winning the toss is a weighted average of the two treatment e¤ects:
Rational decision making, in conjunction with the assignment of decision rights via the toss implies that the proportion of wins by the team winning the toss and batting …rst must exceed 0:5: Similarly, the proportion of wins by the team winning the toss and …elding …rst must exceed 0:5: This prediction is consistent with teams having di¤erent abilities, since the assignment of decision rights is independent of ability.
Aggregation
We now show that our null hypotheses are valid under aggregation, since the assignment of decision rights is via a coin toss. Consider two disjoint sets of teams, I and J; and restrict attention to the set M of matches played between i 2 I and j 2 J: Let ij be the proportion of total matches that are between teams i and j; and index subsets of states that pertain to the team pair by ij: That is, ij is the set of possible states of the world when team i plays team j; and B ij is the set of states where batting …rst is optimal, with F ij being the complement. The no agreement result implies that in a game involving the pair ij Pr(i wins toss and bats …rst) = 1 2 Pr( B ij ) = Pr(j wins toss and bats …rst): (6) Let us select a match in M at random, so that each match has equal probability of being chosen. The probability of the event E, that some team in the set I wins the toss and bats …rst, is given by
Similarly, in this randomly selected match, the probability of the event F that some team in J wins the toss and bats …rst is given by
In this randomly selected match, the probability that a team in I wins the toss is 0:5; and furthermore, this event is independent of any other event. Thus the conditional probability that in this randomly selected match, some team in I bats …rst, given that it has won the toss is given by
While the conditional probability that some team in J bats …rst given that it has won the toss is given by
Since the right hand sides of equations (9) and (10) are identical, we have demonstrated that the no-agreement result aggregates. In any randomly selected match from the set M , the conditional probability that a team in I bats …rst, given that this team has won the toss must equal the conditional probability that a team in J bats …rst, given that it has won the toss. In particular, this is also true when I is a singleton set while J has many elements. It is also true if we consider a team from a single country to come in many variants.
To see that our results on treatment e¤ects also aggregate, consider a randomly selected match from the set M . The probability that the team that wins the toss wins given that it bats …rst is a weighted average of the conditional probabilities from equation (3) Pr[Winj(win toss& bat) = 0:5 X
The right hand side of the expression is a weighted average of terms, each of which is greater than 0:5: It follows therefore that this expression is greater than 0:5: We have therefore veri…ed the validity of the second hypothesis, that the estimated treatment e¤ects are greater than 0.5, when we aggregate across matches.
Similarly, the advantage from …elding …rst given that …elding is optimal is given by
Finally, the advantage from winning the toss is a weighted average of the mean advantage from batting …rst when batting is optimal, and the advantage from …elding …rst when …elding is optimal, i.e.
(13) The intuition behind our aggregation results is straightforward. No agreement implies that in any pair (i; j) of teams, the probability that i bats …rst given that it wins the toss equals the probability that j bats …rst if it wins the toss. The probability of batting …rst may well be di¤erent when we consider a distinct pair (i 0 ; j 0 ): Nevertheless, when we aggregate across teams, the conditional probability that a team in I bats …rst given that its wins the toss equals the conditional probability that a team in J bats …rst given that it wins the toss. The reason for this is that in any match, the event that a team in I wins the toss is independent of the precise identity of the pair (i; j); i.e. it does not depend on whether we have the pair (i; j) or the pair (i 0 ; j 0 ): In contrast, the tests of mixed strategy equilibria (e.g. penalty kicks in soccer) are not valid under aggregation -although the probability of scoring is equal for kicks to the right and kicks to the left for any kicker-keeper pair, they are no longer equal when we aggregate across pairs, since the probability of scoring may di¤er across pairs and may be correlated with equilibrium mixing probability.
In empirical implementation, in testing the no agreement hypothesis, we shall …x the identity of one team (say to be a speci…c country, e.g. Australia), and consider its matches against all its opponents. 6 In our tests of the treatment e¤ects, we will aggregate across all matches. The ability to aggregate implies that our tests have considerable power -for example, in day matches we have a sample of 1334 matches. In contrast, in their analysis of serve decisions in grandslam tennis, Walker and Wooders (2001) must only pool observations where the underlying game can be plausibly assumed to be unvarying, and their sample sizes are usually around 70.
Empirical results
Our data includes all one day international matches played between the nine major international teams, since the inception of international one day games in 1970. 7 We make a distinction which are played entirely in daylight (day matches) and day-night matches where the team batting second does so at night under ‡oodlights. In day-night matches teams have a strong preference for batting …rst in daylight, and the team winning the toss bats …rst 70% of the time, whereas in day matches this proportion is only 40%. Table 1 presents our results on testing no-agreement for day matches. For each of the nine teams, we consider matches played against any of the other eight opponents. The …rst column shows the proportion of times that the team bats 6 Recall the alternative hypothesis on decision-making, that teams possibly overweight their own strengths in choosing whether to bat or …eld. This suggests that one should not aggregate across teams with di¤erent strengths, since we may then fail to reject the null when behavior is in line with the alternative. This is why we test the no agreement hypothesis for each country. 7 These teams represent the countries which have been granted the highest (test-playing) status by the International Cricket Council -we exclude Bangladesh, which only recently acquired such status. The last match in our data set is number 2037, played in July 2003.
Testing no agreement
…rst on winning the toss, and the second column shows the proportion of time that the team …elds …rst on losing the toss. The penultimate column show the value of the Pearson test statistic for the equality of these two probabilities -this is distributed as a 2 with one degree of freedom. The …nal column shows the probability of getting this value of the test statistic under the null hypothesis. The table shows that for six of the nine teams, the proportions in the …rst two columns are close to each other, so that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, for three of the nine teams (West Indies, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level. We …nd that the West Indies and Sri Lanka have a higher probability of …elding …rst as compared to their opponents, whereas Pakistan has a higher probability of batting …rst as compared to its opponents. The fact that consistency is violated in matches involving a speci…c team, say the West Indies, does not imply that the West Indies are making the wrong decision. It does imply, prima facie, that either the West Indies or their opponents are choosing incorrectly. table 2 we consider each of the three teams for whom the null is rejected, exclude any bilateral matches between teams belonging to the set fPakistan, Sri Lanka, West Indiesg). We still …nd that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level for Sri Lanka and the West Indies and rejected at 10% level for Pakistan. table 4 , we …nd that teams have a much stronger preference to bat …rst -indeed, every team bats …rst on winning the toss more frequently in day-night matches as compared to day matches. Although there are some di¤erences between the frequency of batting when winning the toss and the frequency of …elding on losing the toss, the Pearson tests show that null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signi…cance for any of the teams. Note that the sample sizes are much smaller -the mean number of day night matches per team is 120 as compared to 274 in day matches. Table 3 also shows that the null implied by the no-agreement hypothesis cannot be rejected in the sample of day-night matches as a whole. However, when we combine all matches, day and day-night, the null is rejected, since the indicator variables for the identity of the toss winner are jointly signi…cant.
To summarise, the results are mixed across di¤erent classes of matches. In day-night matches, where teams appear to agree on the advantage of batting …rst in daylight, no-agreement cannot be rejected. In day matches, the null is rejected, with three teams -Pakistan, Sri Lanka and West Indies -choosing di¤erently from their opponents. Overall, the results show that the West Indies demonstrate a clear tendency to …eld …rst, as compared to their opponents, in both classes of matches. This is reinforced by the analysis of test matches (Bhaskar, 2007a) , where the West Indies …eld …rst signi…cantly more often than their opponents. This is noteworthy -for a large part of this sample, the West Indies were the strongest team on the international stage. Their dominance was due in large part to a battery of fast bowlers, who were renowned for their pace and hostility, and their ability to intimidate opposing batsmen. Our result suggest that the West Indies favored …elding …rst as an aggressive tactic, based on their fast bowling strength. The no agreement hypothesis suggests that their opponents should respond to this by …elding …rst themselves, in order to neutralise the West Indian fast bowling advantage. However, this may have been perceived as a defensive tactic, especially if the opponents did not have a strong fast bowling attack. Thus teams may have overweighted their own strengths, and underweighted the strengths of their opponents. While the overweighting hypothesis appears to be the most plausible explanation for our results, we need to also consider more conventional explanations, such as asymmetric information.
Treatment e¤ects
Let us now turn to the e¤ect of the chosen decision upon outcomes. Table  5 presents win probabilities as a function of the chosen decision, aggregated across all teams. Under optimal decision making, the probability of a win by the team that wins the toss and chooses to bat must be greater than 0:5; since the assignment of decision rights is independent of team abilities Similarly, the probability of a win by a team that wins the toss and chooses to …eld …rst must also be greater than 0:5: In day-night matches, the team that bats …rst on winning the toss has a signi…cant advantage, winning on 55.5% of occasions. On the other hand, the advantage of …elding …rst is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. In day matches, the team choosing to bat …rst appears to have a signi…cant disadvantage, winning on only 43.7% of the occasions, while the winning frequency of a team choosing to …eld …rst is not signi…cantly di¤erent from 50%. Thus in day matches, teams appear to be choosing sub-optimally, by batting …rst at states where this confers a disadvantage. These results are re ‡ected in our estimates of the advantage of winning the toss -in day-night matches, the team winning the toss wins on 53.7% of occasions, an advantage that is statistically signi…cant at 5% level, while in day matches the team that wins the toss wins only 47.6% of the time, a statistically signi…cant disadvantage. We can therefore reject the null that teams are making decisions optimally in day matches, since the estimated treatment e¤ect from batting …rst is negative. 
Explanations
We now explore alternative explanations for our …ndings. These include asymmetric information, the overweighting hypothesis and agency problems due to which the captain of the team may have concerns other than winning.
Asymmetric information and no agreement
One explanation for violation of the no agreement theorem is asymmetric information. Consider …rst the possibility that a team may have less information about the basic characteristics of opposing players. This is unlikely to be an important factor, since most international teams have a relatively stable core of well established players, whose characteristics are well known. Video footage of international matches is also regularly studied by opponents. For example, in the 2003 world cup tournament, the median number of prior international appearances of players in the team was over one hundred, for each of the nine major teams. Indeed, very few players had made less than 30 appearances. However, a team may not be aware of idiosyncratic factors which a¤ect the other team, e.g. that an individual is player is not fully …t on the day of the match. 10 Idiosyncratic shocks can explain agreement between team decisions one some occasions. However, our formal empirical test -equality of the proportion of times that a team bats …rst when it wins the toss and the proportion of times that it …elds …rst when it loses the toss -only requires that at any state of the world, the probability that a team chooses to bat …rst when it wins the toss equals the probability that its opponent bats …rst when the opponent wins the toss. Thus idiosyncratic shocks do not seem a good explanation for the systematic biases we …nd. To explain systematic biases, one needs to invoke the possibility that one team is systematically better informed than the other. This is possible, since the pitch (the natural surface on which the game is played) plays an important role, and the home team is likely to have better information about the nature of the pitch than the visiting team. This is likely to be true for venues in the home country which are not as well known or internationally established. 11 We now set out a simple model of asymmetric information. Let denote the set of states ; which assumed to be a compact interval: The information of player i; i 2 f1; 2g; is represented by a partition i of : Thus if state ! is realised, and if ! belongs to the k-th element of i's information partition,^ k i , then player i is informed only of the fact that ! 2 k i : If team 1 is informed that ! 2 k 1 ; the probability it assigns to winning from batting …rst is given by
While the probability assigned by team 1 to winning from …elding …rst is given by
Thus it is optimal for team 1 to bat …rst if p
and to …eld …rst otherwise: Similarly, for team 2, it is optimal to bat …rst at ! 2
Let^ 12 be the meet of the two information partitions, 1 and 2 ; i.e. the coarsest partition that is …ner than both 1 and 2 : It is easy to construct examples where^ 12 contains elements (subsets of the state space) where one team chooses to bat while the other chooses to …eld, and we shall provide one shortly.
To investigate whether asymmetric information about pitches can explain no agreement, we …rst consider one day matches at neutral venues, where superior information is unlikely to be a factor. Table 6 reports our results for day matches involving Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the West Indies, where we had found violations of no agreement. We …nd that no agreement is rejected for neutral 1 1 The following anecdote related by Mike Atherton, former captain of England, is illustrative. "At St. Vincent I made an error of judgement at the toss, putting the West Indies in. We went down to a then record defeat for England in one-day internationals. The day before that game I had been, literally, sitting on the dock of the bay watching the time go by, and pondering the team for the next day. A Rastafarian smoking a huge spli¤ came by and we got chatting. 'Man,'he said, 'you always got to bat …rst in St. Vincent and then bowl second when the tide comes in.' The pitch the next day look mottled and uneven and I looked at it uncertainly. Geo¤ Boycott was also on the wicket and I asked his opinion. 'I think you've got to bowl …rst,'he said, 'just to see how bad it is before you bat.' In fact it was very good and the West Indies plundered 313, and then, when the tide came in, it was very bad and we were skittled for 148. I learned my lesson. When it comes to pitches you had never seen before, local knowledge, rather than the Great Yorkshireman's, was eminently preferable. " (Atherton, 2002, p.85) . St. Vincent is one of the lesser known veneues in the West Indies. venues for two of the three teams (Pakistan and West Indies). Next we consider all teams, and restrict attention to matches played at neutral venues. We conduct a 2 -test for the irrelevance of the identity of the winner of toss, in this context, and …nd that this is decisively rejected, despite the considerably lower sample size. This is reported in Table 3 , in the second row. We conclude that violation of no agreement persists in neutral venues where one team is unlikely to have superior information as compared to its rival. Let us turn to matches on venues that are not neutral and explore further the pattern of biases that are likely to emerge when the home team is better informed than the away team. Assume that the home team, team 1, observes !: Assume that with some probability the away team (team 2) also observes !; while with probability 1 team 2 has no information. When team 2 has no information, its optimal choice is given by the average value of , i.e. by
Let us suppose, for the moment, that E( (!)j B ) E( (!)j F ); i.e. the average advantage from batting …rst when batting is optimal approximately equals the average advantage from …elding …rst when …elding is optimal. In this case, when uninformed, team 2 will choose to match the expected decision of team 1. So if the informed team …elds …rst more often, i.e. Pr( F ) > 0:5; the probability that team 2 …elds …rst is given by Pr(
the informed team is more likely to …eld …rst, the uninformed team …elds …rst even more often. The informed team bene…ts from its superior information at states where it is optimal to bat …rst. This conclusion …ts very well the incident related by Atherton, where England made the "wrong" choice by deciding to …eld …rst against a team (West Indies) which chooses to …eld …rst in most situations. We now explore whether the di¤erences in decisions across home and away venues is consistent with the biases implied by the above model of asymmetric information. Speci…cally, we considered the three teams where no agreement fails (Pakistan, Sri Lanka and West Indies), and see how their decisions di¤er from their opponents on home and away venues. Table 7 reports the batting frequencies of the home team and away teams, and the third column reports whether the bias is in the right direction (i.e. consistent with the home team being better informed) or not. The two teams for whom no-agreement is violated at home venues are Sri Lanka and West Indies. Sri Lanka chose to bat …rst only 8% of the time when playing at home. If Sri Lanka had better information, we would expect their opponents to respond to this by choosing to bat …rst even more infrequently. Instead we …nd that they bat …rst substantially more often than Sri Lanka, with a discrepancy on 29% of the occasions. The magnitudes involved also imply that the approximation
for this argument is quite loose, since it su¢ ces that E( j B ) < 11E( j F )
for our conclusions to hold. A similar argument applies to the West Indiesalthough they bat …rst only 28% of the time at home, their opponents respond by batting …rst substantially more often, at 50%. This reinforces our general conclusion, that asymmetric information can explain speci…c departures from no-agreement, but cannot plausibly explain the systematic departures we …nd in the data.
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To summarise, asymmetric information about the pitch could conceivably explain the rejection of no-agreement. However, we …nd this explanation is not entirely plausible. No agreement is rejected when we restrict attention to neutral venues. On non-neutral venues, the pattern of biases are not consistent with the way the uninformed away team behaves relative to the decisions of the home team. 
Asymmetric information and treatment e¤ects
We now show that asymmetric information may bias the simple estimates of treatment e¤ects reported in table 5. However, we also show that it easy to correct for this bias, and this does not a¤ect our basic conclusions. Bias arises under asymmetric information since a team may bat …rst with a greater frequency than its opponent, and it may also be more able. However, given any pair of teams, the di¤erence between the win frequency of team i when it wins the toss and bats …rst, as compared to its win frequency when it loses the toss and …elds …rst, provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment e¤ect of batting …rst, given that batting …rst is assessed to be optimal.
Let z ij index the relative abilities of the two teams, i and j, and let the probability that team i wins given that it bats …rst be given by
Let the probability that team i wins given that j bats …rst be given by:
, the proportion of the time that the team choosing to bat …rst is team i: The probability of winning, conditional on a team choosing to bat; is given by
0 at every information set where team i chooses to bat …rst, the term in square brackets is positive. This term can still be interpreted as the average treatment e¤ect when the treatment is optimal, with the caveat that the two teams do not always agree at all states that the treatment is optimal. However, if 6 = 0:5; the probability of winning also depends upon relative ability. This implies that the winning probabilities in table 5 are not unbiased estimates of treatment e¤ects, since ability may be correlated with the propensity to bat …rst.
There is however a simple way of dealing with this. Consider the set of matches between i and j. The probability that i wins given that i wins the toss and chooses to bat equals:
The probability that i wins, given that i loses the toss and …elds, equals
The di¤erence between these two probabilities therefore equals
where the last inequality follows from the fact both teams are choosing optimally, so that E( (!)j B i ) > 0 and E( (!)j B j ) > 0: Consider matches between i and j where the team winning the toss chooses to bat …rst, and regress the binary variable for the outcome (from the point of view of team i) upon a constant and an indicator variable for team i winning the toss. The coe¢ cient on this indicator variable provides an unbiased estimate of the average advantage from batting …rst, when batting …rst is assessed to be optimal.
Consider now the set of matches played between any pair of teams, ij; where for any given pair ij; the relative ability is constant and given by z ij : In any pair, let us describe outcomes from the point of view of one …xed team. Restrict attention to matches where the team winning the toss bats …rst, and regress the outcome upon indicator variables for team pairs and upon an indicator variable which takes value one if the reference team has won the toss. The coe¢ cient on this last variable provides an estimate of the weighted average advantage from batting …rst when batting …rst is assessed to be optimal. More precisely, this coe¢ cient is a weighted average of [E( (!)j In our empirical implementation, we pool across all matches, both where the team winning the toss chooses to bat …rst and where it chooses to …eld …rst, since we have assumed that the ability controls are team pair speci…c. We estimate probit models, where the dependent variable equals one if the reference team wins the game. table 8 ) is given by the di¤erence in marginal e¤ects between the dummy for winning the toss and batting and that for losing the toss and …elding. Similarly, the e¤ect of …elding …rst when …elding is optimal is given by the di¤erence in marginal e¤ects between the dummy for winning the toss and …elding and that for losing the toss and batting.
We experimented with a number of di¤erent ways of controlling for ability, and our results are robust across speci…cations. In the speci…cation reported in Table 8 , our ability indicators are team and time-period speci…c. That is, we construct indicator variables for four di¤erent time periods and interact these with team indicator variables. 14 We also include a "home advantage" dummy -this is a categorical variable which takes value 1 if the game is played at home (i.e. in the country of the reference team), value 1 if the game is played in the country of reference team's opponent, and zero if played at a neutral venue. The estimates reported in column one of …eld) ), while the estimate with ability controls is -0.14. Similarly, the advantage when choosing to bat …rst in day-night matches is 0.11 from table 5, while with ability controls this advantage is 0.12. The estimation with controls has the advantage that the standard errors are considerably reduced. It is noteworthy that the point estimate of the disadvantage from choosing to bat …rst in day matches is substantial -indeed, it is larger than the advantage that a team gains from playing at its home venue as compared to a neutral venue.
Similarly, the advantage that a team gains on choosing to bat …rst in day-night matches is also substantial, although this is less surprising, since teams seem to be choosing optimally in this case. In column 2, we allow a team's ability to di¤er between home and away games, i.e. we do not restrict the home advantage to be the same across teams. The estimated treatment e¤ects are very similar to those estimated in column 1. We also estimated the equation separately for the sample of day matches and the sample of day-night matches, thus allowing the ability coe¢ cients to vary across type of match, but again this did not make any di¤erence to the results. Finally, we experimented with di¤erent periodisations of the time speci…c dummies, but this again did not make any di¤erence. Thus our basic conclusions, that teams had a signi…cant advantage from choosing to bat …rst in day-night matches, and a signi…cant disadvantage from choosing to bat …rst in day matches, is unaltered by allowing for controls for ability, and is robust across a variety of speci…cations. Finally, note that even if we are unable to completely control for ability, this in itself is not a problemthe estimated treatment e¤ects are only biased if the uncontrolled variation in ability is correlated with the propensity to bat …rst. Overall, our results con…rm that allowing for asymmetric information does not change the basic conclusion, that teams do not make decisions very well when they win the toss. In day-night matches, where cricket commentators recognise the advantage from batting …rst, teams tend to bat …rst (over 70% of the time) and appear to derive a signi…cant advantage when they choose to bat. In one day internationals which are played in the day, teams which choose to bat …rst seem to have a signi…cant disadvantage from this choice.
Heterogeneous priors
An alternative explanation for our results is that agents have di¤erent prior beliefs, contrary to the Harsanyi doctrine. That is, team i could have beliefs such that it assesses the advantage from batting …rst at state ! as i (!); which may di¤er from team j 0 s assessment, j (!): Furthermore, these beliefs may be quite di¤erent from the true value of : Heterogeneous priors can explain why no agreement fails, since one team may systematically think that i (!) is positive while its opponent thinks that j (!) is negative. They can also explain why teams take suboptimal decisions, i.e. their beliefs are well calibrated. While the assumption of common priors has hitherto been almost universal in economic modelling, this has been relaxed in some recent papers -see Morris (1995) for a discussion of the common prior assumption. The assumption of heterogeneous priors is more palatable in a one-shot situation, where agents have had limited opportunities to learn: In the context of cricket, agents have ample opportunities to learn about (!), not merely in international matches as those analysed here, but also in numerous domestic matches. Standard learning models show that as long as agents beliefs contain a "grain of truth", learning by observation would result in priors that are well calibrated and also close to being the same.
Overweighting strength
We have argued that asymmetric information does not provide a convincing explanation for the failure of no-agreement in day matches. Instead, it seems that teams overweight their own strengths (or weaknesses), and underweight the strengths or weaknesses of their opponents. This is reinforced by the …nding that one team in particular -the West Indies -chose to …eld …rst more often than their opponents in all forms of international cricket since the 1970s (see Bhaskar (2007a) for an analysis of decisions in test matches). The West Indies were the undisputed champions of the world for a large part of this period, until the mid 1990s. Their dominance was based on a hostile fast bowling attack, which was unparalleled in cricketing history, and capable of intimidating their opponents -unlike baseball, it is a legitimate cricket tactic for a bowler to hit the body of the batsman with the ball. Indeed, the West Indies would usually play with four fast bowlers, and without any spin bowler at all. Thus the West Indies would often choose to …eld …rst, allowing their fast bowlers to exploit the early moisture on the pitch. This suggests that it would be optimal for their opponents to …eld …rst, in order to deny the West Indies this advantage.
Nevertheless, we …nd that the opponents often batted …rst, since they did not have a fast bowling attack as capable as that of the West Indies. In other words, faced with the aggressive tendency of the West Indies to …eld …rst, their opponents did not respond defensively by …elding …rst, but instead chose to bat …rst on many occasions. Table 1 provides suggestive evidence in favor of this hypothesis -the variance of the numbers in …rst column exceeds that of the numbers in the second column, implying that the identity of the team that wins the toss in ‡uences the probability of batting …rst more than the identity of the team that loses the toss.
Non-maximizing behavior and agency problems
One explanation for our results is that captains do not seek to maximise the probability of winning, but are concerned about other factors. For instance, a captain may conceivably be concerned not only with the outcome, but may also be keen to avoid too severe a defeat. It is hard to see how this could conceivably explain our results, since at the toss, a decision that maximises the probability of winning is also likely to minimise the size of any defeat. More serious is the match-…xing scandal that a-icted parts of international cricket in the 1990s, when several leading cricketers accepted money from book-makers. We re-did the analysis excluding all matches where there are allegations of match-…xing -Polak (2000) provides a comprehensive listing of these matches. We …nd that this makes no signi…cant di¤erence to our results, and two anomalies we …nd for day matches persist. Similarly, one can redo the empirical analysis leaving out the weaker teams (for example, Zimbabwe or Sri Lanka in the early period before 1983) and this does not alter our results. The historical background of cricket and the way in which the decision maker (the team captain) is evaluated may result in his having somewhat di¤erent interests than simply maximizing the probability of winning, thus resulting in an agency problem. This could explain the tendency to bat …rst excessively often in day matches, and consequent estimated negative treatment e¤ect. Traditions play an important role in cricket, and test cricket was the only form of the game at international level, till 1970. Test match pitches used to be left uncovered when play was not in session, hastening their deterioration over the …ve days of play. This meant a recognizable advantage to batting …rst 16 and in test matches before 1975, captains chose to bat on 87% of occasions. This had a signi…cant positive e¤ect on their winning probability -Bhaskar (2007a) …nds that the team choosing to bat …rst wins 55% of the time in matches with a result. In more recent times, the practice of covering pitches when play is not in session has reduced this advantage signi…cantly. The technology of making pitches has also improved, increasing their durability, and making batting last less di¢ cult. In one day matches, the scope for deterioration is more limited. Finally, in one day matches (as opposed to test matches), the team batting second has the advantage of knowing precisely what score needs to be made to secure victorythe dynamic programming analysis of Clarke (1999) and Preston and Thomas (2000) …nd this to be quantitatively signi…cant.
Cricket was faced with a new innovation -one day cricket -where the relative gain from …elding …rst was high compared to test cricket. This is particularly so in one day matches played in the day time. However, the data shows that captains have not learned very well to make decisions in this new environment. 17 One explanation is as follows: the captain's decision is evaluated by cricket commentators (usually former cricketers), and in the …nal analysis, by the selectors of the team, who are usually also former cricketers. These evaluators may have outdated information, with a consequent bias against batting …rst. This bias appears to exist, certainly in the context of test matches -as the former England captain Brearley writes, "it is irrationally felt to be more of a gamble to put the other side in (to bat)... decisions to bat …rst, even when they have predictably catastrophic consequences, are rarely held against one" (Brearley, 1985, p. 116) . Thus a variant on the management adage "no one ever got …red for buying IBM", may well partially explain the persistence of suboptimal decisions. Given the relatively short time horizon over which captains are evaluated, captains who choose to bat when there is a small advantage to …elding …rst may well survive longer than those who choose optimally. This explanation mirrors explanations for the phenomenon of short-termism by managers of …rms. For example, Brandenburger and Polak (1996) set out a model where managers who are concerned about the current share price of their …rm make choices in line with market opinion, rather than those suggested by their own superior private information. This suggests that the competitiveness of the environment -the fact that the captain is externally assessed -may have militated against optimal decision making.
Why are cricket commentators unable to learn that batting …rst in day matches is often sub-optimal? One reason maybe that even the more statistically minded of commentators do not consider the correct counter-factual. The typical statistical exercise considers a team's performance when it bats …rst as compared to when its …elds …rst. However, when one allows for heterogeneity in states, it is not clear what the sign of this e¤ect would be, even with optimal decision making. Our analysis has hinged on interactive decision making, i.e. our hypotheses are generated under the assumption of optimality of decision making by pairs of teams.
It would be interesting to see if decision making has improved over time due to learning. However, we …nd that there is no improvement in the estimated treatment e¤ects, and nor is there a greater tendency for captains to …eld …rst in day matches. In view of the fact that very simple learning rules (such as reinforcement learning) give rise to optimal decision making in the long run, it would be worthwhile exploring further why such anomalies persist. To this end, we intend to estimate learning models in the cricket context, to see why the failure to learn persists over such a long period of time.
Conclusions
While tests of decision theory have examined the consistency of decisions of a single decision maker with stable preferences, the innovation of our study has been the examination of the consistency of decision makers whose interests are opposed. For this purpose, we are able to exploit "randomised trials"which are inherent in the rules of the game. We …nd signi…cant violations of consistency and optimality in decision making. These violations are best explained by a tendency for teams to overweight their own strengths, and underweight those of their opponents. Our randomised trials also allow us to identify average treatment e¤ects, conditional on the treatment being optimal. Here again we …nd evidence that choices are not made optimally, with agents choosing actions that reduce their win probability. This later …nding is signi…cant since the magnitude of the loss from choosing badly is large, and its estimated value is robust to the possibility of asymmetric information.
Cricket, like most professional sport, is extremely competitive. The set of possible outcomes of a game is binary, and as simple as it could conceivably be. This simplicity should, in conjunction with the randomised trials, make decisions easy to evaluate. Nevertheless, sub-optimal decision-making seems to have persisted over a long period of time, possibly due to the desire of captains to "cover their posteriors" (Brandenburger and Polak, 1996) . Our …nding complements that of Romer (2006) , who …nds that American football teams do not maximise their winning probability. These …ndings have important implications for economists, since they suggest that non-maximizing behaviour survives in extremely competitive environments where performance evaluation by external observers is relatively simple. This suggests that in more complex environments -such as those where most …rms operate -competition would not necessarily weed out sub-optimal behaviour. Thus Milton Friedman's "as-if"' paradigm may not be empirically valid. The challenge remains to identify anomalies in behaviour in these more complex situations. In the meantime we suggest that professional sports provides ample opportunities to test the e¤ect of competition on the optimality of decision-making.
